

EMPLOYMENT APPEALS BOARD DECISION
2026-EAB-0700

Affirmed
Disqualification

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: On June 16, 2026, the Oregon Employment Department (the Department) served notice of an administrative decision concluding that claimant voluntarily quit work without good cause and therefore was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits from May 10, 2026 to May 8, 2027 (decision # L0018332574). Claimant filed a timely request for hearing. On July 23, 2026, ALJ Laurie-Gardiner conducted a hearing, at which the employer failed to appear, and on July 24, 2026, issued Order No. 26-UI-335789, modifying decision # L0018332574 by concluding that claimant voluntarily quit work without good cause and was disqualified from receiving benefits effective May 10, 2026, and until requalified. On August 5, 2026, claimant filed an application for review with the Employment Appeals Board (EAB).

WRITTEN ARGUMENT: Claimant submitted a written argument received with her application for review on August 10, 2026. Claimant also submitted written arguments on September 2, 2026, and September 9, 2026. EAB did not consider claimant's August 10, 2026 argument because she did not state that she provided a copy of her argument to the employer as required by OAR 471-041-0080(2)(a) (May 13, 2019).

Claimant's September 2, 2026 argument was sent by email, and her September 9, 2026 argument was mailed. The contents of the submissions are virtually identical. The two submissions contain a three-page argument written by claimant. They also contain a one-page statement written by one of claimant's former coworkers, and three emails to claimant from the employer's CEO. As to the three-page argument, it contains information that was not part of the hearing record and does not show that factors or circumstances beyond claimant's reasonable control prevented her from offering the information during the hearing. Under ORS 657.275(2) and OAR 471-041-0090 (May 13, 2019), EAB considered only information received into evidence at the hearing. EAB considered the parts of claimant's three-page argument contained in the September 2, 2026, and September 9, 2026 submissions that were based on the hearing record.

As to the one-page statement written by one of claimant's coworkers, and the three emails to claimant from the employer's CEO, claimant requested that EAB consider the documents as additional evidence

under OAR 471-041-0090(1)(b). Under OAR 471-041-0090(1)(b), “Any party may request that EAB consider additional evidence, and EAB may allow such a request when the party offering the additional evidence establishes that: (A) The additional evidence is relevant and material to EAB’s determination, and (B) Factors or circumstances beyond the party’s reasonable control prevented the party from offering the additional evidence into the hearing record.”

Applying this standard, as to the three emails to claimant from the employer’s CEO, claimant’s request is denied because claimant did not show that factors or circumstances beyond her reasonable control prevented her from offering the emails into the hearing record. Claimant offered numerous other emails into evidence at hearing and the ALJ admitted those emails into the hearing record as part of Exhibit 1. Audio Record at 6:47. It was within claimant’s reasonable control to have included the three emails in question here among those documents that were considered by the ALJ and admitted into evidence. As to the one-page statement written by one of claimant’s coworkers, the request is granted. While the statement is of limited probative value, the information it contains is of some relevance and materiality. Further, a factor beyond claimant’s reasonable control prevented the coworker from testifying at the hearing, as the coworker states in the statement that they were concerned about testifying at hearing because they were worried about the employer taking adverse action against them since at the time of the hearing they were an employee of the employer.

The coworker’s statement has been marked as EAB Exhibit 1, and provided to the parties with this decision. Any party that objects to EAB taking notice of this information must send their objection to EAB in writing, saying why they object, within ten days of EAB mailing this decision. OAR 471-041-0090(2). Unless EAB receives and agrees with the objection, the exhibit will remain in the record.

FINDINGS OF FACT: (1) Four G Corporation, doing business as Another Source, employed claimant as a sales development representative from December 2, 2024 until May 13, 2026. The employer’s business was to assist customers, such as institutions of higher education, with recruiting candidates for the customers’ job openings.

(2) Claimant’s job required her to identify and vet individuals whom the employer’s business development team could convert into a customer, such as someone with budgetary or decision-making authority within an organization, and then set up meetings between such individuals and the employer’s business development team. Claimant and the other representatives were paid a commission of \$100 per meeting they set up. Additionally, if a meeting resulted in the individual placing an order for the employer to help their organization fill a job, the representative would receive a percentage of the search fee earned from the job order by the employer.

(3) The employer evaluated the performance of claimant and the other representatives based on the number of meetings they set up each month. The employer expected representatives to set up ten meetings per month, though representatives rarely met that goal, instead averaging two to three meetings per month.

(4) Under the position description when claimant was hired, she was an exempt employee, meaning not subject to rules for minimum wage and overtime pay, with a base salary of \$65,000 per year along with commission-based compensation discussed above. Rather than be expected to work a strict 9-to-5 schedule, claimant was permitted flexibility in her work schedule in order to work with prospects in

different time zones and to accommodate her needs as a parent. The employer had advertised the job as having flexible hours, which was an aspect of the job that made it attractive to claimant.

(5) During claimant's employment, most of the prospects she identified who could be set up for a meeting came from attending conferences. The employer gave each representative a \$5,000 budget to attend conferences. When claimant attended a conference in a month she usually set up five or more meetings, although she was also able to set up some meetings and earn commission income in months in which she did not attend conferences. Claimant's highest earning months during her employment were months in which she attended conferences. Through prospects claimant identified from attending one conference, she secured the employer's first ever partnership with a national organization in higher education.

(6) On November 21, 2025, claimant began a maternity leave. Claimant was scheduled to return from the maternity leave on May 14, 2026.

(7) In December 2025, while claimant was away on leave and unaware, the employer created a new position description for claimant's job and changed some aspects of the job. Whereas previously claimant's job had been exempt status, the employer changed the job to non-exempt status, meaning the \$65,000 base salary was converted to hourly pay. The employer also changed the representatives' performance goal from ten to five meetings set up per month, or that revenue generated every three months through a representative's prospects placing job orders with the employer had to exceed one-fourth of the representative's base pay. Per the revised position description, representatives were explicitly subject to being discharged if they failed to meet their performance goal for three consecutive months. Additionally, the employer no longer gave representatives a budget to use on conferences at their discretion. Instead, the employer required representatives to meet their performance criteria for three months in a row to be considered eligible to attend a conference. The employer imposed these changes on the other sales development representatives beginning in December 2025 and throughout the time claimant was on maternity leave.

(8) On April 20, 2026, the employer's CEO, who was claimant's supervisor, sent claimant an email requesting confirmation that claimant would be returning to work on May 14, 2026. The CEO phrased the question in terms of whether claimant would be returning to work on that date during "the core hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m." Transcript at 14. Claimant confirmed that she would be returning that day, but found the CEO's mention of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. to be odd because she had worked a flexible schedule before going on leave.

(9) On May 8, 2026, a coworker informed claimant that there had been changes to aspects of their sales representative job. The coworker provided claimant with a copy of the December 2025 revised job description the employer had created for the position.

(10) On May 8, 2026, claimant sent an email to the employer's CEO expressing concern about changes made to her job, such as the requirement that conference attendance had to be earned by meeting performance goals for three consecutive months. Exhibit 1 at 9. In the email, claimant asked for a meeting with the CEO to discuss the changes before her scheduled return on May 14, 2026. A few hours later, the CEO sent a reply email, stating that she did not have time to meet prior to claimant's return, and planned to meet with her on May 18, 2026 to discuss updates to claimant's role. Exhibit 1 at 8.

(11) On May 11, 2026, claimant emailed the CEO again. Exhibit 1 at 10. In this email, claimant reiterated her concerns regarding changes to her job reflected in the revised position description, such as conference attendance having to be earned, and that representatives were explicitly subject to termination if they failed to meet their performance goal for three consecutive months. Claimant insisted that the CEO provide written clarification regarding these changes to the job before her return date.

(12) On May 12, 2026, the CEO sent a reply email, which included a bullet point list addressing numerous changes created by the revised position description, along with explanations for the changes. Exhibit 1 at 12-13. In the email, the CEO addressed the changes regarding representatives having to meet their performance criteria for three months in a row to be considered eligible to attend a conference and that representatives were subject to discharge if they failed to meet their performance goal for three consecutive months. As to the former, the CEO stated that the change was intended to improve return on investment for conference attendance and protect the employer financially. As to the latter, the CEO stated that the performance goal had been made easier to attain because the monthly meeting goal was reduced from 10 to 5 per month, and could alternatively be met by claimant generating an amount of revenue every three months that exceeded one-fourth of her base pay through her prospects whom she had previously set up for meetings placing job orders with the employer.

(13) The CEO also stated in the email that the job was changed from exempt to non-exempt. Exhibit 1 at 12. The CEO did not refer to whether claimant's work schedule would be flexible or expected to be a 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule. However, based on the CEO's reference to "the core hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m." in her April 20, 2026 email, claimant assumed that along with changing her job from exempt to non-exempt, the employer would expect her to adhere to a schedule of Monday through Friday 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Transcript at 14.

(14) On May 13, 2026, claimant sent the CEO an email stating that she was resigning with immediate effect. Exhibit 1 at 14. Claimant stated that she was resigning because of the changes to her job that were made while she was on maternity leave, and expressed disappointment that the employer did not inform her of the changes when they were implemented in December 2025.

(15) The specific changes that claimant found objectionable were that the employer required representatives to meet their performance criteria for three months in a row to be considered eligible to attend a conference, that she was explicitly subject to being discharged if she failed to meet her performance goal for three consecutive months, and that the job was changed from exempt to non-exempt status. In the resignation email, claimant also mentioned, "I do not believe I am being returned to the same role under the same terms and conditions I held prior to my leave, as is my right under Oregon law." Exhibit 1 at 14.

CONCLUSIONS AND REASONS: Claimant voluntarily quit work without good cause.

A claimant who leaves work voluntarily is disqualified from the receipt of benefits unless they prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they had good cause for leaving work when they did. ORS 657.176(2)(c); *Young v. Employment Dept.*, 170 Or App 752, 13 P3d 1027 (2000). "Good cause . . . is such that a reasonable and prudent person of normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common sense, would leave work." OAR 471-030-0038(4) (September 22, 2020). "[T]he reason must be of such gravity

that the individual has no reasonable alternative but to leave work.” OAR 471-030-0038(4). The standard is objective. *McDowell v. Employment Dept.*, 348 Or 605, 612, 236 P3d 722 (2010).

Claimant did not meet her burden to prove that she quit work with good cause. Claimant quit working for the employer because, while she was on maternity leave, the employer made several changes to her job that she found objectionable. Claimant failed to prove that these changes, individually or in combination, presented her with a situation of such gravity that she had no reasonable alternative but to quit work when she did.

Specifically, first, whereas previously claimant was an exempt-status employee and had a flexible schedule, the employer had changed the job to an hourly non-exempt status that claimant assumed would not have a flexible schedule. At hearing, claimant explained that the aspect of this change that was objectionable to her was her belief that she would lose a flexible schedule, because working flexible hours was useful for working with prospects who lived in different time zones and enabled her to work in the evenings after her children went to bed. Transcript at 6. Although it is clear that the job claimant would return to would be a non-exempt hourly job, given that the revised job description referred to the job as non-exempt and that the CEO had reiterated this in her May 12, 2026 email, it was not a foregone conclusion at the time claimant quit that the employer would forbid her from working flexible hours. Claimant’s belief that she would not be permitted to work flexible hours upon her return was based on the CEO’s April 20, 2026 email in which the CEO asked claimant to confirm if she was returning to work on May 14, 2026 during “the core hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.” Transcript at 14.

However, neither the revised position description nor the CEO’s May 12, 2026 explanatory email stated that claimant would have a strict 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule. Further, claimant acknowledged at hearing that before she resigned, she did not clarify with the CEO whether she would have work schedule flexibility upon her return to work. Transcript at 15. Claimant failed to prove that she faced a grave situation based upon the possibility that she would lose work schedule flexibility because the CEO’s single reference to “the core hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.” in the April 20, 2026 email was not a sufficient basis to conclude that the employer would prevent a flexible schedule. Moreover, as the work schedule flexibility issue appeared undecided given that it went unmentioned in the revised position description and the CEO’s May 12, 2026 explanatory email, as to this issue, claimant failed to pursue the reasonable alternative of simply clarifying with the CEO whether she would be allowed to work a flexible schedule, notwithstanding the fact that the job would be an hourly non-exempt job. Claimant could have pursued the reasonable alternative of discussing this matter by raising it via email or by meeting with the CEO at the time the CEO had offered to do so, on May 18, 2026.

Next, whereas previously claimant was given a budget to attend conferences at her discretion, the employer had changed this aspect of the job, requiring claimant and the other representatives to first meet their performance goal for three months in a row to be considered eligible to attend a conference. This change was objectionable to claimant because she had found that conference attendance was a significant driver of her ability to set up meetings and positively impacted her pay as she earned a \$100 commission for each meeting she set up. Prior to taking leave, claimant usually set up five or more meetings in a month when she attended a conference, and claimant’s highest earning months during her employment were months in which she attended conferences.

However, although, at least during the first three months following her return to work, this change would have limited claimant’s ability to use conferences to find individuals with whom to set up

meetings and therefore was likely to have curtailed her earnings to some degree, claimant failed to prove that she faced a grave situation based on the employer changing this aspect of her job. Absent a legal or contractual prohibition, the employer was free to change their conference attendance policy, and it appeared they had a reasonable basis to do so as the CEO explained in her May 12, 2026 email that the change was intended to improve return on investment for conference attendance and protect the employer financially. While it may have been likely to result in a reduction in claimant's commission income, at least at first, historically claimant had earned some commission income without attending conferences. Therefore, under the revised conference attendance policy claimant would still have received her base pay along with the commission income she generated without attending conferences.

To the extent claimant's resignation was intended to avoid a curtailment of her earnings resulting from first having to meet her performance goal for three months before she could attend a conference, claimant quit work without good cause because she did not show that she benefited from quitting. *See Oregon Public Utility Commission v. Employment Dep't.*, 267 Or App 68, 340 P3d 136 (2014) (for a claimant to have good cause to voluntarily leave work, the claimant must derive some benefit from leaving work). This is the case because by quitting to avoid lost commission income opportunities under the revised conference attendance policy, claimant stopped working for the employer and lost her employment as a source of income entirely.

Another aspect of claimant's objection to the revised conference attendance policy was that she was concerned that she would not meet her performance goal because the inability to attend conferences at her discretion would restrict the number of meetings she could set up each month. However, as the CEO noted in her May 12, 2026 email, the performance goal had been made easier to attain under the revised job description because the monthly meeting goal was reduced from 10 to 5 per month, and the performance goal could alternatively be met by claimant generating an amount of revenue every three months that exceeded one-fourth of her base pay through her prospects, whom she had previously set up for meetings, placing job orders with the employer.

It was not certain at the time that claimant resigned that she would be unable to meet her performance goal through one of these pathways. It is possible that had she returned to work, even without initially being able to attend conferences, that claimant would find she could set up five meetings per month. Such was the case for one of claimant's coworkers, who worked under the revised conference attendance policy from December 2025 until at least late July 2026 and met their performance goal each month, even though they were never approved to attend a conference. *See* EAB Exhibit 1 at 1. Further, given claimant's success in having secured a partnership for the employer with the national organization in higher education, it is not implausible that claimant could have met the goal through the alternative method of generating an amount of revenue every three months that exceeded one-fourth of her base pay through her prospects, such as those within the national organization, placing job orders with the employer. In any event, to conclude in advance that she would not meet the performance goal, and then quit working for the employer, claimant failed to derive a benefit from quitting. This is so because losing her employment as a source of income entirely made her worse off than continuing to work even if it was uncertain under the revised conference attendance policy whether she would meet her performance goal.

Third, whereas before claimant's position description made no explicit reference to claimant being subject to termination, the revised position description explicitly stated that representatives, such as

claimant, were subject to being discharged if they failed to meet their performance goal for three consecutive months. Claimant failed to show that the employer's making explicit this consequence for unsatisfactory performance presented her with a situation of gravity. In any employment relationship there is the possibility that unsatisfactory performance could result in a person's employment being terminated. Though it may have been worrisome to see this consequence for unsatisfactory performance explicitly stated, the fact that the employer stated their expectations in this regard at least offered some clarity and provided a minimum benchmark. As discussed above, the employer had in some ways made the performance goal easier to meet, and it was not a foregone conclusion at the time that claimant quit that she would be unable to meet the performance goal for three consecutive months. It was incumbent upon claimant to attempt to meet the employer's performance expectation rather than conclude in advance that she would fail for three months in a row, and quit in anticipation of being discharged before there was a significant risk that a discharge would actually occur.

Finally, in claimant's resignation email, she asserted that she had the right under Oregon law to be returned to the same job under the same terms and conditions she held prior to her maternity leave. *See* Exhibit 1 at 14 ("I do not believe I am being returned to the same role under the same terms and conditions I held prior to my leave, as is my right under Oregon law."). It is correct that certain provisions of law, if applicable, create job protections when someone takes a leave of absence. If an employer were to violate these provisions and subject someone to an unlawful employment practice, it is possible for that person to quit work with good cause to avoid being subjected to that unlawful practice. *See J. Clancy Bedspreads and Draperies v. Wheeler*, 152 Or App 646, 954 P2d 1265 (1998) (where unfair labor practices are ongoing or there is a substantial risk of recurrence, it is not reasonable to expect claimant to continue to work for an indefinite period of time while the unfair practices are handled by BOLI).

Here, it is necessary to evaluate whether certain job protection provisions under the Paid Leave Oregon program or the Oregon Family Leave Act (OFLA) applied in claimant's circumstance. The two statutory schemes provide virtually identical protections. Under Paid Leave, "[A]fter returning to work after a period of family leave . . . , an eligible employee is entitled to be restored to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced, if that position still exists[.]" ORS 657B.060(1)(a). Under OFLA, "After returning to work after taking family leave . . . an eligible employee is entitled to be restored to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced if that position still exists[.]" ORS 659A.171(1).

Each statute is elaborated upon by administrative rules that are substantially similar. Under Paid Leave, "An employer must restore an employee returning from Paid Leave Oregon leave to the employee's former position if the position still exists[.] . . . The employee's former position is the position held by the employee at the time Paid Leave Oregon leave commenced, regardless of whether the job has been renamed or reclassified. (For example, a delivery driver must be returned to the same route, at the same rate of pay and benefits, driving the same type of truck, delivering the same type of goods, on the same shift, and working from the same location as when the driver started Paid Leave Oregon leave.)" OAR 839-009-0150(2) (January 1, 2026). Under OFLA, "An employer must restore an employee returning from OFLA leave . . . to the employee's former position if the job still exists[.] . . . The former position is the position held by the employee at the time OFLA leave began, regardless of whether the job has been renamed or reclassified. (For example, a delivery driver must be returned to the same route, at the same rate of pay and benefits, driving the same truck, delivering the same goods, on the same shift and

working the same location as when the driver started OFLA leave.).” OAR 839-009-0270(1) (July 1, 2024).

Claimant failed to prove that these provisions applied in her circumstance. As to Paid Leave, the duty of an employer to restore an employee to the position held when the leave commenced only attaches when the employee returns from Paid Leave Oregon leave, and the record contains no evidence that claimant applied for and received Paid Leave benefits during her maternity leave. As to OFLA, only employers who employ 25 or more employees are subject to OFLA. *See* ORS 659A.153(1). As the record fails to show whether the employer met that threshold, claimant failed to prove that the employer was covered by OFLA and subject to the duty to restore an employee returning from OFLA leave to their former position. Even if a duty to restore claimant to her former position under Paid Leave or OFLA did attach to the employer, it is not evident that the changes the employer made to claimant’s job, such as changing the classification from exempt to non-exempt and the revised conference attendance policy, were sufficiently material such that the employer would be viewed as having failed to restore claimant to the position she held when her leave commenced. Accordingly, the record fails to show that the employer subjected claimant to an unlawful employment practice by changing some aspects of her job, and claimant therefore did not establish that she quit with good cause to avoid being subjected to an unlawful practice.

For the reasons discussed above, claimant voluntarily quit work without good cause and therefore is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits effective May 10, 2026.

DECISION: Order No. 26-UI-335789 is affirmed.

D. Hettle and A. Steger-Bentz;
S. Serres, not participating.

DATE of Service: September 25, 2026

NOTE: You may appeal this decision by filing a Petition for Judicial Review with the Oregon Court of Appeals **within 30 days of the date of service stated above**. *See* ORS 657.282. For forms and information, visit <https://www.courts.oregon.gov/courts/appellate/forms/Pages/appeal.aspx> and choose the appropriate form under “File a Petition for Judicial Review.” You may also contact the Court of Appeals by telephone at (503) 986-5555, by fax at (503) 986-5560, or by mail at 1163 State Street, Salem, Oregon 97301.

Please help us improve our service by completing an online customer service survey. To complete the survey, please go to <https://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/5552642/EAB-Customer-Service-Survey>. If you are unable to complete the survey online and wish to have a paper copy of the survey, please contact our office.



Understanding Your Employment Appeals Board Decision

English

Attention – This decision affects your unemployment benefits. If you do not understand this decision, contact the Employment Appeals Board immediately. If you do not agree with this decision, you may file a Petition for Judicial Review with the Oregon Court of Appeals following the instructions written at the end of the decision.

Simplified Chinese

注意 – 本判決會影響您的失業救濟金。如果您不明白本判決，請立即聯繫就業上訴委員會。如果您不同意此判決，您可以按照該判決結尾所寫的說明，向俄勒岡州上訴法院提出司法複審申請。

Traditional Chinese

注意 – 本判決會影響您的失業救濟金。如果您不明白本判決，請立即聯繫就業上訴委員會。如果您不同意此判決，您可以按照該判決結尾所寫的說明，向俄勒岡州上訴法院提出司法複審申請。

Tagalog

Paalala – Nakakaapekto ang desisyong ito sa iyong mga benepisyo sa pagkawala ng trabaho. Kung hindi mo naiintindihan ang desisyong ito, makipag-ugnayan kaagad sa Lupon ng mga Apela sa Trabaho (Employment Appeals Board). Kung hindi ka sumasang-ayon sa desisyong ito, maaari kang maghain ng isang Petisyon sa Pagsusuri ng Hukuman (Petition for Judicial Review) sa Hukuman sa Paghahabol (Court of Appeals) ng Oregon na sinusunod ang mga tagubilin na nakasulat sa dulo ng desisyon.

Vietnamese

Chú ý - Quyết định này ảnh hưởng đến trợ cấp thất nghiệp của quý vị. Nếu quý vị không hiểu quyết định này, hãy liên lạc với Ban Kháng Cáo Việc Làm ngay lập tức. Nếu quý vị không đồng ý với quyết định này, quý vị có thể nộp Đơn Xin Tái Xét Tư Pháp với Tòa Kháng Cáo Oregon theo các hướng dẫn được viết ra ở cuối quyết định này.

Spanish

Atención – Esta decisión afecta sus beneficios de desempleo. Si no entiende esta decisión, comuníquese inmediatamente con la Junta de Apelaciones de Empleo. Si no está de acuerdo con esta decisión, puede presentar una Aplicación de Revisión Judicial ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones de Oregon siguiendo las instrucciones escritas al final de la decisión.

Russian

Внимание – Данное решение влияет на ваше пособие по безработице. Если решение Вам непонятно – немедленно обратитесь в Апелляционный Комитет по Трудоустройству. Если Вы не согласны с принятым решением, вы можете подать Ходатайство о Пересмотре Судебного Решения в Апелляционный Суд штата Орегон, следуя инструкциям, описанным в конце решения.

Khmer

ចំណុចសំខាន់ – សេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះមានផលប៉ះពាល់ដល់អត្ថប្រយោជន៍គ្មានការងារធ្វើរបស់លោកអ្នក។ ប្រសិនបើលោកអ្នកមិនយល់អំពីសេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះ សូមទាក់ទងគណៈកម្មការឧទ្ធរណ៍ការងារភ្លាមៗ។ ប្រសិនបើលោកអ្នកមិនយល់ស្របចំពោះសេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះទេ លោកអ្នកអាចដាក់ពាក្យប្តឹងសុំឲ្យមានការពិនិត្យរឿងក្តីឡើងវិញជាមួយតុលាការឧទ្ធរណ៍រដ្ឋ Oregon ដោយអនុវត្តតាមសេចក្តីណែនាំដែលសរសេរនៅខាងចុងបញ្ចប់នៃសេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះ។

Laotian

ເອົາໃຈໃສ່ – ຄໍາຕັດສິນນີ້ມີຜົນກະທົບຕໍ່ກັບເງິນຊ່ວຍເຫຼືອການຫວ່າງງານຂອງທ່ານ. ຖ້າທ່ານບໍ່ເຂົ້າໃຈຄໍາຕັດສິນນີ້, ກະລຸນາຕິດຕໍ່ຫາຄະນະກຳມະການອຸທອນການຈ້າງງານໃນທັນທີ. ຖ້າທ່ານບໍ່ເຫັນດີນໍາຄໍາຕັດສິນນີ້, ທ່ານສາມາດຍື່ນຄໍາຮ້ອງຂໍການທົບທວນຄໍາຕັດສິນນໍາສານອຸທອນລັດ Oregon ໄດ້ໂດຍປະຕິບັດຕາມຄໍາແນະນໍາທີ່ບອກໄວ້ຢູ່ຕອນທ້າຍຂອງຄໍາຕັດສິນນີ້.

Arabic

هذا القرار قد يؤثر على منحة البطالة الخاصة بك، إذا لم تفهم هذا القرار، إتصل بمجلس منازعات العمل فوراً، و إذا كنت لا توافق على هذا القرار، يمكنك رفع شكوى للمراجعة القانونية بمحكمة الاستئناف بأوريغون و ذلك بإتباع الإرشادات المدرجة أسفل القرار.

Farsi

توجه - این حکم بر مزایای بیکاری شما تاثیر می گذارد. اگر با این تصمیم موافق نیستید، بلافاصله با هیأت فرجام خواهی استخدام تماس بگیرید. اگر از این حکم رضایت ندارید، می‌توانید با استفاده از دستورالعمل موجود در پایان آن، از دادگاه تجدید نظر اورگان درخواست تجدید نظر کنید.

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