EO: Intrastate
BYE: 07-Feb-2026

State of Oregon
Employment Appeals Board
875 Union St. N.E.
Salem, OR 97311

609
VQ 005.00
DS 005.00

EMPLOYMENT APPEALS BOARD DECISION
2025-EAB-0302

Reversed
No Disqualification Week 07-25
Disqualification Effective Week 08-25

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: On March 21, 2025, the Oregon Employment Department (the Department) served notice of an administrative decision concluding that the employer discharged claimant, but not for misconduct, within 15 days of a planned voluntary leaving without good cause, and was therefore not disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits for the week of February 9, 2025 through February 15, 2025 (week 07-25), but was disqualified from receiving benefits effective February 16, 2025 (decision # L0009880097).[1] Claimant filed a timely request for hearing. On May 12, 2025, ALJ Bender conducted a hearing, and on May 19, 2025, issued Order No. 25-UI-292593, reversing decision # L0009880097 by concluding that claimant voluntarily quit work with good cause and therefore was not disqualified from receiving benefits based on the work separation. On May 21, 2025, the employer filed an application for review with the Employment Appeals Board (EAB).

WRITTEN ARGUMENT: The employer submitted written arguments on May 21, 2025, and May 28, 2025. EAB did not consider the employer's May 21, 2025, argument because the employer did not state that they provided a copy of the argument to claimant as required by OAR 471-041-0080(2)(a) (May 13, 2019). Both arguments contained information that was not part of the hearing record and did not show that factors or circumstances beyond the employer's reasonable control prevented them from offering the information during the hearing as required by OAR 471-041-0090 (May 13, 2019). EAB considered only information received into evidence at the hearing. EAB considered any parts of the employer's May 28, 2025, argument that were based on the hearing record.

Claimant submitted a written argument on June 10, 2025. Claimant's argument contained information that was not part of the hearing record and did not show that factors or circumstances beyond claimant's reasonable control prevented her from offering the information during the hearing. Under ORS

[1] Decision # L0009880097 stated that claimant was denied benefits from February 9, 2025, to February 7, 2026. However, decision # L0009880097 should have stated that claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits beginning Sunday, February 16, 2025, and until she earned four times her weekly benefit amount. *See* ORS 657.176(8) and (2).

657.275(2) and OAR 471-041-0090, EAB considered only information received into evidence at the hearing. EAB considered any parts of claimant's argument that were based on the hearing record.

FINDINGS OF FACT: (1) Charles M Kaady employed claimant as a shift operator at their car wash from June 28, 2024, until February 13, 2025.

(2) In their job posting and upon hiring claimant, the employer advised that after claimant completed 90 days of employment, she would be potentially eligible for a promotion with a $1 per hour pay raise. In late September or October 2024, the employer conducted claimant's 90-day review. At that time, the employer identified some performance critiques related to pacing and not approaching cars, and declined to promote claimant or give her a raise.

(3) Also in late September or early October 2024, claimant accidentally got the door of the car wash jammed. She and her coworker had to call in a technician to repair the door, which delayed closing the car wash for the day. The coworker was unhappy about being prevented from going home, yelled at claimant, and threw cash tips at her.

(4) On November 19, 2024, claimant made a complaint to the employer's human resources (HR) department about the coworker's conduct on the day they had to stay late. Claimant had had a difficult relationship with the coworker, and found he had a disagreeable attitude at work making statements such as, "[S]ee ya. Wouldn't want to be ya," and calling her and others a "loser." Transcript at 14-15. Though the HR department did not disclose to claimant the nature or scope of the discipline, claimant understood from speaking with her manager that the employer gave the coworker a disciplinary write-up for his conduct on the day the two had to stay late. Claimant viewed that discipline as inadequate. After claimant made the complaint against the coworker, the employer continued scheduling him at times to work the same shifts as claimant, and he was unfriendly when they worked together. The coworker never threw anything at claimant again.

(5) As early February approached, claimant was scheduled to have a second 90-day review, after which she hoped to be promoted and receive the $1 per hour pay raise. On January 27, 28, and 31, 2025, claimant was late to work. On each occasion, claimant was late by only one minute.

(6) On January 31, 2025, a customer arrived at the car wash driving a "dually" truck, a truck with two wheels on each side of the rear axle. Transcript at 16-17. The car wash could not accommodate a dually truck without risking damage to the truck or the wash equipment, and the employer considered it a type of vehicle that employees were not supposed to run through the car wash. Claimant did not know she was not supposed to run the dually truck through the car wash. Claimant was concerned about the wheel configuration of the truck, however, and walked it through the car wash manually. When she did so, no damage was done to the truck or the wash equipment.

(7) Also on January 31, 2025, claimant requested and was approved to take February 14, 15, and 16, 2025 off work.

(8) On February 3, 2025, the employer gave claimant a verbal warning for being late to work on January 27, 28, and 31, 2025.

(9) On February 5, 2025, claimant was again late to work by one minute.

(10) Claimant worked morning shifts from 7:25 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Claimant was late on January 27, 28, 31, and February 5, 2025, because on those days, the lock of the car wash door was "sticky" in the cold winter mornings and delayed her on each occasion in reaching the time clock by a minute. Transcript at 11.

(11) On February 6, 2025, claimant had a second 90-day review and the employer again declined to promote claimant or give her a raise. The employer declined to do so because claimant had run the dually truck through the car wash on January 31, 2025, and because of her tardiness on January 27, 28, 31, and February 5, 2025.

(12) Claimant thought it was unfair for the employer to deny her the promotion in part due to her having run the dually truck through the wash. Claimant thought the employer's training handbook did not specify that dually trucks were prohibited from the car wash, and that the employer had added dually trucks to the handbook only after the January 31, 2025 incident. However, the training handbook did specify on January 31, 2025 that dually trucks were "no wash" vehicles. Transcript at 32.

(13) Also on February 6, 2025, the employer gave claimant a second warning, in writing, for being late to work. The written warning documented the tardies for which claimant had previously received a verbal warning, January 27, 28, and 31, 2025. It also documented claimant's tardiness on February 5, 2025.

(14) Claimant thought the written warning for the tardies was "retaliatory disrespect" because in each instance she had been late by only one minute. Transcript at 7. Claimant viewed the written warning as the "final straw" that warranted ending the employment relationship. Transcript at 12. On February 7, 2025, claimant gave the employer notice of her intent to resign effective February 21, 2025. Claimant planned to resign effective February 21, 2025 because of the February 6, 2025 written warning. That the employer declined to promote claimant or give her a raise following her second 90-day review, and did so in part based on the dually truck incident, also factored into claimant's plan to resign effective February 21, 2025.

(15) Claimant was present and punctual for work every day she was scheduled to work after she gave notice of her intent to resign. On February 13, 2025, claimant reported to her shift as usual at 7:30 a.m. There was snowy weather that day and the employer decided to close the car wash early at 9:00 a.m. At that time claimant's manager met with claimant, gave her her final paycheck, and told her that the employer was terminating her employment.

CONCLUSIONS AND REASONS: The employer discharged claimant, not for misconduct, within 15 days of claimant's planned voluntary leaving without good cause.

Work Separation. If an employee could have continued to work for the same employer for an additional period of time, the work separation is a voluntary leaving. OAR 471-030-0038(2)(a) (September 22, 2020). If the employee is willing to continue to work for the same employer for an additional period of time but is not allowed to do so by the employer, the separation is a discharge. OAR 471-030-0038(2)(b).

The work separation was a discharge that occurred on February 13, 2025. On that date, claimant's manager met with claimant, told her that the employer was terminating her employment, and gave her her final paycheck. Previously, on February 7, 2025, claimant gave notice of her intent to resign effective February 21, 2025. Claimant intended to work through her notice period. Because claimant was willing to continue working for the employer until February 21, 2025, but was not allowed to do so by the employer, the work separation was a discharge that occurred on February 13, 2025.

Discharge. ORS 657.176(2)(a) requires a disqualification from unemployment insurance benefits if the employer discharged claimant for misconduct connected with work. "As used in ORS 657.176(2)(a) . . . a willful or wantonly negligent violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employee is misconduct. An act or series of actions that amount to a willful or wantonly negligent disregard of an employer's interest is misconduct." OAR 471-030-0038(3)(a). "'[W]antonly negligent' means indifference to the consequences of an act or series of actions, or a failure to act or a series of failures to act, where the individual acting or failing to act is conscious of his or her conduct and knew or should have known that his or her conduct would probably result in a violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employee." OAR 471-030-0038(1)(c). In a discharge case, the employer has the burden to establish misconduct by a preponderance of evidence. *Babcock v. Employment Division*, 25 Or App 661, 550 P2d 1233 (1976).

The employer discharged claimant on February 13, 2025. At hearing, the employer's witness articulated a couple of different reasons why the employer discharged claimant. First, the witness testified that in the employer's experience, employees who, like claimant, give notice of their intent to resign often do not work during their notice period and instead no call, no show, or, work but cause "conflict" or "contention" while "on their way out." Transcript at 25-26. The witness explained that in that scenario, the employer makes sure the employee's shifts are covered by others then advises that the employee need not work during the notice period. Transcript at 25-26. The witness stated, "So that's what happened" regarding claimant's work separation. Transcript at 26. To the extent that the employer discharged claimant for this reason, essentially because it was convenient for the employer to end claimant's employment rather than allow her to work through her notice period, the employer did not discharge claimant for a willful or wantonly negligent violation of a workplace policy and so did not discharge claimant for misconduct.

The employer's witness also referenced claimant's February 6, 2025, written warning, which documented her tardies on January 27, 28, and 31, 2025 and on February 5, 2025. Transcript at 27. The witness testified that "the attendance thing is the biggest part of why they decided to end [claimant's employment] before the full two weeks was over." Transcript at 32-33. Then, seeming to restate the point made earlier, the witness stated, "What happens is oftentimes people's attendance issues when we let them do their full two weeks they end up . . . not showing up." Transcript at 33. To the extent this testimony was meant to convey that the employer discharged claimant because they perceived her as a risk to not work her scheduled shifts during the notice period, the employer's reason for discharging claimant did not amount to misconduct. The mere risk that claimant would fail to report to work did not constitute a willful or wantonly negligent violation of a workplace policy. Though claimant was scheduled to take February 14, 15, and 16, 2025 off work, these absences were requested in advance by claimant and approved by the employer. Furthermore, the employer's view that claimant was likely to fail to report to work during her notice period is contradicted by the record, since the record shows that,

after tendering her resignation, claimant was present and punctual for work every day she was scheduled until the employer discharged her.

To the extent the employer witness's testimony referencing the February 6, 2025, written warning and statement that "the attendance thing is the biggest part of why they decided to end [claimant's employment] before the full two weeks was over" was meant to convey that the employer discharged claimant because of the tardies documented by the written warning, the employer's reason for discharging claimant did not amount to misconduct. At hearing, claimant credibly explained that the reason she was late for work on January 27, 28, 31, and February 5, 2025, was because the lock of the car wash door was "sticky" in the cold winter mornings and delayed her on each occasion in reaching the time clock by a minute. Transcript at 11.

Given that the tardies were trivial violations of only one minute that were driven by environmental factors, the record fails to show that the tardies were misconduct. The tardies were not willful violations of the employer's expectations because claimant did not intend to be late. The tardies also were not wantonly negligent violations of the employer's expectations. The employer failed to prove that claimant was indifferent to the consequences of her actions, an element of wanton negligence the employer bears the burden to prove, because external factors relating to cold weather contributed to claimant being late on those occasions and in each instance, claimant was late by only one minute.

For the reasons discussed above, the record fails to show that the employer discharged claimant because she had engaged in a willful or wantonly negligent violation of the standards of behavior the employer had the right to expect of her, or a disregard of the employer's interests. Accordingly, the employer did not discharge claimant for misconduct under ORS 657.176(2)(a).

ORS 657.176(8). The analysis continues, however, because it is necessary to assess whether ORS 657.176(8) applies to this case. ORS 657.176(8) states, "For purposes of applying subsection (2) of this section, when an individual has notified an employer that the individual will leave work on a specific date and it is determined that: (a) The voluntary leaving would be for reasons that do not constitute good cause; (b) The employer discharged the individual, but not for misconduct connected with work, prior to the date of the planned voluntary leaving; and (c) The actual discharge occurred no more than 15 days prior to the planned voluntary leaving, then the separation from work shall be adjudicated as if the discharge had not occurred and the planned voluntary leaving had occurred. However, the individual shall be eligible for benefits for the period including the week in which the actual discharge occurred through the week prior to the week of the planned voluntary leaving date."

The employer discharged claimant, but not for misconduct, on February 13, 2025, which was within 15 days of claimant's planned leaving on February 21, 2025. Therefore, the applicability of ORS 657.176(8) turns on whether claimant's planned leaving was without good cause.

Voluntary Leaving. "Good cause . . . is such that a reasonable and prudent person of normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common sense, would leave work." OAR 471-030-0038(4). "[T]he reason must be of such gravity that the individual has no reasonable alternative but to leave work." OAR 471-030-0038(4). The standard is objective. *McDowell v. Employment Department*, 348 Or 605, 612, 236 P3d 722 (2010). A claimant who quits work must show that no reasonable and prudent person would have continued to work for their employer for an additional period of time.

The order under review concluded that claimant voluntarily quit work with good cause. Order No. 25-UI-292593 at 3. The record does not support this conclusion.

Claimant's planned leaving was without good cause. The main reason for claimant's planned leaving was the employer's February 6, 2025, written warning for tardies, which claimant viewed as "retaliatory disrespect" because in each instance she had been late by only one minute. Transcript at 7. Though one minute was an insignificant amount of time by which to be late, and, as discussed above, claimant credibly testified at hearing that external factors contributed to her being late on those occasions, the employer was within their authority to give claimant a disciplinary write-up for the violations. It is undisputed that claimant was late for work on those occasions and in violation of the employer's policy. The employer's witness testified, unrebutted, that their policy treated being tardy by one minute as a violation. Transcript at 27-28. Claimant's irritation at being written up for trivial violations of the employer's expectations was understandable. However, the employer's conduct of giving claimant a warning for tardies that admittedly occurred and which claimant did not contest were in violation of their policy, did not present claimant with a situation of such gravity that she had no reasonable alternative but to leave work.

Another reason for claimant's planned leaving was that, following claimant's second 90-day review, the employer declined to promote claimant or give her a raise. Transcript at 12. Claimant asserted at hearing that she "well deserved" the promotion, and that her manager had told her she was a valued employee. Transcript at 12, 6. Claimant's disappointment at not being promoted was understandable. However, to the extent her planned quit was based on this reason, it was for a reason that does not constitute good cause. The employer declined to promote claimant because she had run the dually truck through the car wash on January 31, 2025, and because of her tardiness on January 27, 28, 31, and February 5, 2025. Though claimant disputed that she knew or should have known that washing the dually truck was prohibited, she did not contest that the tardies occurred. Claimant did not prove that the employer lacked a legitimate basis to rely on the January 27, 28, 31, and February 5, 2025, tardies as reasons for denying claimant's promotion. Furthermore, claimant's planned quit on the basis of being denied the pay raise was without good cause because it would mean that claimant would lose her job and source of income entirely, leaving her in a worse position than if she remained employed but without the promotion and raise in pay. *See Oregon Public Utility Commission v. Employment Dep't.*, 267 Or App 68, 340 P3d 136 (2014) (for a claimant to have good cause to voluntarily leave work, the claimant must derive some benefit for leaving work).

At hearing, claimant testified that another reason for her planned leaving was "the whole thing with the dually truck and them trying to blame me for something that I couldn't have known." Transcript at 12. This appears to allude to the employer's citing claimant running the dually truck through the car wash on January 31, 2025, as a reason to not promote her as well as the issue, disputed by the witnesses at hearing, of whether claimant should have known she was not supposed to run the dually truck through the car wash. At hearing, claimant testified that the employer's training handbook did not specify that dually trucks were prohibited from the car wash, and that the employer had added dually trucks to the handbook only after the January 31, 2025, incident. Transcript at 7, 15-16, 17, 34. The employer's witness disputed this, asserting that the training handbook did specify on January 31, 2025, that dually trucks were "no wash" vehicles and denying claimant's assertion that the manual was changed after the incident. Transcript at 31-32. As claimant bears the burden of proof as to whether her planned quit was for reasons constituting good cause and the evidence is equally balanced on this point, the facts have

been found in accordance with the employer's account. Therefore, more likely than not, the training handbook did specify on January 31, 2025, that dually trucks were "no wash" vehicles. Accordingly, claimant failed to prove that the employer acted improperly in expecting claimant to know that she was not supposed to run the dually truck through the car wash, or in citing the dually truck incident as a reason for not promoting her. To the extent claimant's planned quit was based on this reason, it was for a reason that does not constitute good cause.

Finally, claimant's planned leaving was without good cause to the extent it was based on having to work with the disagreeable coworker who had thrown claimant's cash tips at her on the day the two had to stay late at the car wash. The coworker threw the tips at claimant in late September or early October 2024, several months before claimant tendered her resignation. Afterward, on November 19, 2024, claimant complained to HR, and claimant understood from speaking with her manager that the employer gave the coworker a disciplinary write-up for his conduct on the day the two had to stay late. Though claimant viewed that discipline as inadequate, it is undisputed that the employer was responsive to claimant's complaint, and, thereafter, the coworker did not throw anything at claimant again. Further, it is possible that the employer's responsive action against the coworker was more severe than claimant understood it to be, because the employer's HR department did not disclose to claimant the nature of scope of the coworker's discipline.

In any event, besides the throwing of cash tips on one occasion, a behavior the coworker did not repeat, the source of claimant's difficulties with the coworker was that he was unfriendly, and had a disagreeable attitude at work making statements such as, "[S]ee ya. Wouldn't want to be ya," and calling her and others a "loser." Transcript at 14-15. The coworker's general unfriendliness or tendency to make remarks like "see ya . Wouldn't want to be ya," would not have caused a reasonable and prudent person to leave work, and therefore those aspects of the coworker's behavior are not sufficient to have presented claimant with a grave situation.

The coworker's calling claimant and others "loser" was more significant. However, claimant did not show that the coworker's name-calling presented her with a situation of such gravity that she had no reasonable alternative but to leave work. It is not evident that claimant was scheduled to work with the coworker on a frequent basis after she made her complaint to the HR department, and the record fails to show how often the coworker called claimant a "loser" when they did work together. Moreover, claimant could have pursued the reasonable alternative of requesting not to be scheduled to work with the coworker, or complaining about the coworker's name-calling to the HR department. Doing so likely would have given rise to an investigation and responsive action, given that the HR department took action in response to the complaint claimant made after the coworker threw her tips at her.

For the foregoing reasons, claimant's February 21, 2025, planned voluntary leaving was without good cause. Thus, because the employer discharged claimant, but not for misconduct, within 15 days prior to the date she planned to voluntarily leave work without good cause, ORS 657.176(8) applies to this case.

Accordingly, ORS 657.176(8) requires that claimant be disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits effective February 16, 2025 (week 08-21). Claimant is *not* disqualified from receiving benefits for the week of February 9, 2025, through February 15, 2025 (week 07-21).

DECISION: Order No. 25-UI-292593 is set aside, as outlined above.

D. Hettle and A. Steger-Bentz;
S. Serres, not participating.

DATE of Service: June 25, 2025

NOTE: You may appeal this decision by filing a Petition for Judicial Review with the Oregon Court of Appeals **within 30 days of the date of service stated above**. *See* ORS 657.282. For forms and information, visit https://www.courts.oregon.gov/courts/appellate/forms/Pages/appeal.aspx and choose the appropriate form under "File a Petition for Judicial Review." You may also contact the Court of Appeals by telephone at (503) 986-5555, by fax at (503) 986-5560, or by mail at 1163 State Street, Salem, Oregon 97301.

Please help us improve our service by completing an online customer service survey. To complete the survey, please go to https://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/5552642/EAB-Customer-Service-Survey. If you are unable to complete the survey online and wish to have a paper copy of the survey, please contact our office.

Understanding Your Employment Appeals Board Decision

English

Attention – This decision affects your unemployment benefits. If you do not understand this decision, contact the Employment Appeals Board immediately. If you do not agree with this decision, you may file a Petition for Judicial Review with the Oregon Court of Appeals following the instructions written at the end of the decision.

Simplified Chinese

注意 – 本判决会影响您的失业救济金。 如果您不明白本判决， 请立即联系就业上诉委员会。 如果您不同意此判决，您可以按照该判决结尾所写的说明，向俄勒冈州上诉法院提出司法复审申请。

Traditional Chinese

注意 – 本判決會影響您的失業救濟金。 如果您不明白本判決， 請立即聯繫就業上訴委員會。 如果您不同意此判決，您可以按照該判決結尾所寫的說明， 向俄勒岡州上訴法院提出司法複審申請。

Tagalog

Paalala – Nakakaapekto ang desisyong ito sa iyong mga benepisyo sa pagkawala ng trabaho. Kung hindi mo naiintindihan ang desisyong ito, makipag-ugnayan kaagad sa Lupon ng mga Apela sa Trabaho (Employment Appeals Board). Kung hindi ka sumasang-ayon sa desisyong ito, maaari kang maghain ng isang Petisyon sa Pagsusuri ng Hukuman (Petition for Judicial Review) sa Hukuman sa Paghahabol (Court of Appeals) ng Oregon na sinusunod ang mga tagubilin na nakasulat sa dulo ng desisyon.

Vietnamese

Chú ý - Quyết định này ảnh hưởng đến trợ cấp thất nghiệp của quý vị. Nếu quý vị không hiểu quyết định này, hãy liên lạc với Ban Kháng Cáo Việc Làm ngay lập tức. Nếu quý vị không đồng ý với quyết định này, quý vị có thể nộp Đơn Xin Tái Xét Tư Pháp với Tòa Kháng Cáo Oregon theo các hướng dẫn được viết ra ở cuối quyết định này.

Spanish

Atención – Esta decisión afecta sus beneficios de desempleo. Si no entiende esta decisión, comuníquese inmediatamente con la Junta de Apelaciones de Empleo. Si no está de acuerdo con esta decisión, puede presentar una Aplicación de Revisión Judicial ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones de Oregon siguiendo las instrucciones escritas al final de la decisión.

Russian

Внимание – Данное решение влияет на ваше пособие по безработице. Если решение Вам непонятно – немедленно обратитесь в Апелляционный Комитет по Трудоустройству. Если Вы не согласны с принятым решением, вы можете подать Ходатайство о Пересмотре Судебного Решения в Апелляционный Суд штата Орегон, следуя инструкциям, описанным в конце решения.

Khmer

ចំណុចសំខាន់ – សេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះមានផលប៉ះពាល់ដល់អត្ថប្រយោជន៍គ្មានការងារធ្វើរបស់លោកអ្នក។ ប្រសិនបើលោកអ្នកមិនយល់អំពីសេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះ សូមទាក់ទងគណៈកម្មការឧទ្ធរណ៍ការងារភ្លាមៗ។ ប្រសិនបើលោកអ្នកមិនយល់ស្របចំពោះសេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះទេ លោកអ្នកអាចដាក់ពាក្យប្តឹងសុំឲ្យមានការពិនិត្យរឿងក្តីឡើងវិញជាមួយតុលាការឧទ្ធរណ៍រដ្ឋ Oregon ដោយអនុវត្តតាមសេចក្តីណែនាំដែលសរសេរនៅខាងចុងបញ្ចប់នៃសេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះ។

Laotian

ເອົາໃຈໃສ່ – ຄຳຕັດສິນນີ້ມີຜົນກະທົບຕໍ່ກັບເງິນຊ່ວຍເຫຼືອການຫວ່າງງານຂອງທ່ານ. ຖ້າທ່ານບໍ່ເຂົ້າໃຈຄຳຕັດສິນນີ້, ກະລຸນາຕິດຕໍ່ຫາຄະນະກຳມະການອຸທອນການຈ້າງງານໃນທັນທີ. ຖ້າທ່ານບໍ່ເຫັນດີນຳຄຳຕັດສິນນີ້, ທ່ານສາມາດຍື່ນຄຳຮ້ອງຂໍການທົບທວນຄຳຕັດສິນນຳສານອຸທອນລັດ Oregon ໄດ້ ໂດຍປະຕິບັດຕາມຄຳແນະນຳທີ່ບອກໄວ້ຢູ່ຕອນທ້າຍຂອງຄຳຕັດສິນນີ້.

Arabic

هذا القرار قد يؤثر على منحة البطالة الخاصة بك، إذا لم تفهم هذا القرار، إتصل بمجلس منازعات العمل فورا، و إذا كنت لا توافق على هذا القرار، يمكنك رفع شكوى للمراجعة القانونية بمحكمة الإستئناف بأوريغون و ذلك بإتباع الإرشادات المدرجة أسفل القرار.

Farsi

توجه - این حکم بر مزایای بیکاری شما تاثیر می گذارد. اگر با این تصمیم موافق نیستید، بلافاصله با هیأت فرجام خواهی استخدام تماس بگیرید. اگر از این حکم رضایت ندارید، می‌توانید با استفاده از دستورالعمل موجود در پایان آن، از دادگاه تجدید نظر اورگان درخواست تجدید نظر کنید.

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