EO: Intrastate
BYE: 15-Mar-2025

State of Oregon
Employment Appeals Board
875 Union St. N.E.
Salem, OR 97311

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VQ 005.00

EMPLOYMENT APPEALS BOARD DECISION
2024-EAB-0655

Reversed
Disqualification

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: On May 3, 2024, the Oregon Employment Department (the Department) served notice of an administrative decision concluding that claimant voluntarily quit work without good cause and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits effective March 17, 2024 (decision # L003990440). Claimant filed a timely request for hearing. On June 18, 2024, and continuing on July 25 and August 14, 2024, ALJ Strauch conducted a hearing, and on August 27, 2024, issued Order No. 24-UI-263896, reversing decision # L0003990440 by concluding that claimant voluntarily quit work with good cause and was therefore not disqualified from receiving benefits based on the work separation. On September 13, 2024, the employer filed an application for review with the Employment Appeals Board (EAB).

WRITTEN ARGUMENTS: EAB considered written arguments from claimant and the employer in reaching this decision.

FINDINGS OF FACT: (1) First Congregational Church of Portland employed claimant as their business manager from May 2022 until March 5, 2024.

(2) Prior to and during claimant's employment, claimant suffered from "extreme anxiety and childhood post-traumatic stress [disorder]" for which he sometimes sought treatment. June 18, 2024, Transcript at 18.

(3) From August 1, 2022, through January 14, 2024, claimant had a supervisor with whom he had a stressful relationship. Claimant believed that the supervisor was too demanding, was not sufficiently concerned with or accommodating of his mental health conditions after discussing them with her, and would unreasonably deny some of his requests to use accrued leave, including to attend therapy sessions. In October 2023, claimant complained about the supervisor's denial of his leave requests to the employer's personnel committee, who advised him that the supervisor would be retiring in January 2024 and that would likely resolve the issue. The supervisor retired on January 14, 2024, and the issues claimant had complained of did not continue once her successor took over.

(4) The employer expected that their employees would not have angry outbursts at work. They also expected that their employees would not engage in "intoxication at work [or] using or dealing alcohol or drugs unlawfully at work," but the employer did not prohibit "having a drink during [work] hours." July 27, 2024, Transcript at 6-7. The employer also expected that employees who supervised other employees would promptly notify the employer of important personnel matters involving their subordinate employees, such as an intent to resign. Claimant understood each of these expectations. The employer also expected that employees who supervised others would not excessively discuss matters in their personal lives with their subordinates. Claimant was not told of this expectation.

(5) During claimant's employment, he would "on occasion" have a cocktail at a restaurant during the lunch hour. June 18, 2024, Transcript at 13. Claimant also encouraged others to drink on such occasions, which made at least one of his subordinate employees uncomfortable. On one occasion, claimant brought alcohol to a tenant of one of the church offices at the tenant's request and claimant and the tenant drank in the office. Claimant never drank to the point of intoxication during work hours. Claimant did not believe that his alcohol possession or use under these circumstances violated the employer's policies.

(6) Claimant and an office manager whom he supervised "talked about [their] personal lives" with each other on "many" occasions during claimant's employment. June 18, 2024, Transcript at 16. In February 2024, the office manager complained to the employer that she "considered herself [claimant's] therapist as a result of these conversations. June 18, 2024, Transcript at 14. Claimant did not believe that these conversations with the office manager were unwelcome or violated the employer's policies.

(7) On February 8, 2024, claimant became upset because he had not received some work documents that he had been expecting from a person who regularly did business with the employer. In the presence of the office manager, claimant "raised [his] voice in frustration. . . used a couple of expletives and. . . picked up the table and pounded the floor with it a couple times." June 18, 2024, Transcript at 8. The noise from this was so loud that other tenants near the office rushed in to check on the occupants' safety. After witnessing this outburst, the office manager felt that she could no longer work for the employer due to claimant's behavior. Claimant later apologized to the office manager and the tenants.

(8) On or around February 12, 2024, the office manager told claimant that she intended to resign. Claimant asked her to reconsider, and she agreed to think about it. On approximately February 14 or 15, 2024, she again told claimant that she intended to resign. Claimant again asked her to reconsider, and she again took time to think about it over the weekend. On February 20, 2024, she sent claimant a letter of resignation by email. In the email, the office manager cited claimant's conduct on February 8, 2024, which she referred to in the letter as "the events that have transpired," as the reason she was resigning. Exhibit 21 at 1. The office manager also stated that she intended the resignation to become effective on March 22, 2024, so that the employer would have time to hire a replacement and for her to train the replacement. Claimant requested that the office manager send a revised resignation letter that did not allude to the February 8, 2024, incident. On February 21, 2024, the office manager sent a second resignation letter to claimant, omitting reference to "the events that have transpired" as claimant requested. *See* Exhibits 21 and 22. Claimant did not immediately inform the employer of the resignation.

(9) On Monday, February 26, 2024, claimant told the office manager that he had not notified the employer of her resignation but that he intended to the following afternoon at a previously scheduled

meeting. The following morning, February 27, 2024, the employer learned of the office manager's resignation prior to the scheduled meeting and the circumstances that caused her to quit work, including the February 8, 2024, incident. The employer notified claimant that he was suspended from work for up to a week while they investigated the February 8, 2024, incident, claimant's failure to notify the employer of the office manager's resignation, claimant's alcohol use related to work, and claimant's personal disclosures to the office manager. Claimant was paid from his accrued leave during the suspension.

(10) The employer asked claimant to respond to the allegations against him at the start of the investigation, and claimant provided verbal and written responses by February 28, 2024. On February 27, 2024, while providing his verbal rebuttal, claimant offered to resign. The employer rejected his resignation, and encouraged him to see the investigation through to its conclusion. On March 1, 2024, the employer sent an email to claimant stating, in part, that the accounts of witnesses in the investigation "are consistently at odds with your statements. Their description of your behaviors and actions support a conclusion that there are several significant incidents where you didn't meet the performance standards and requirements set forth in the business manager position description. It appears that you are recasting these incidents to support [your stance]. . . that there isn't a basis for disciplinary action, up to and including termination." Exhibit 14 at 1.

(11) On March 2, 2024, claimant emailed a resignation letter to the employer stating that it would be effective "on Tuesday, March 5, 10:35 am. This is the conclusion of my five-day administrative leave." Exhibit 8 at 1. The employer had not concluded their investigation into claimant when the letter was received, but ceased investigating at that time due to claimant's resignation. The employer had not decided whether to discharge claimant at that time. Claimant felt at the time of his resignation that the employer had not allowed him "an unbiased grievance process" and had engaged in "hostility" toward him by placing him on leave and conducting the investigation rather than summarily excusing the February 8, 2024, incident as a mental health episode and arranging pastoral and medical assistance and leave for him. Exhibit 4 at 2. Claimant did not work for the employer after March 5, 2024.

CONCLUSIONS AND REASONS: Claimant voluntarily quit work without good cause.

Voluntary leaving. A claimant who leaves work voluntarily is disqualified from the receipt of benefits unless they prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they had good cause for leaving work when they did. ORS 657.176(2)(c); *Young v. Employment Department*, 170 Or App 752, 13 P3d 1027 (2000). "Good cause . . . is such that a reasonable and prudent person of normal sensitivity, exercising ordinary common sense, would leave work." OAR 471-030-0038(4) (September 22, 2020). "[T]he reason must be of such gravity that the individual has no reasonable alternative but to leave work." OAR 471-030-0038(4). The standard is objective. *McDowell v. Employment Department*, 348 Or 605, 612, 236 P3d 722 (2010). Claimant had "extreme anxiety and childhood post-traumatic stress [disorder]" a permanent or long-term "physical or mental impairment" as defined at 29 CFR §1630.2(h). A claimant with an impairment who quits work must show that no reasonable and prudent person with the characteristics and qualities of an individual with such an impairment would have continued to work for their employer for an additional period of time. Per OAR 471-030-0038(5)(b)(F), leaving work without good cause includes "[r]esignation to avoid what would otherwise be a discharge for misconduct or potential discharge for misconduct[.]"

Claimant voluntarily quit work to avoid what would otherwise be a potential discharge for misconduct. At hearing, claimant contended that he did not quit to avoid the possibility of discharge, but instead quit due to what he considered a "hostile work environment" due to the prior conflict with his former supervisor, being placed on administrative leave, and becoming the subject of an investigation he felt was being unfairly conducted. July 24, 2024, Transcript at 7; Exhibit 4 at 2. The record does not support that these were claimant's reasons for quitting. Further, even if claimant had quit for these reasons, they did not constitute a grave situation.

Claimant's former supervisor, who was the initial source of claimant's belief that he was the target of hostility, retired on January 14, 2024. The record does not suggest that the problems which claimant felt existed under the previous supervisor persisted under her successor. Therefore, more likely than not, these past problems were not pertinent to claimant's decision to quit at the time he stopped working. Moreover, even if claimant had quit work not to avoid a potential discharge, but because he had been placed on leave and become the subject of an investigation, a reasonable and prudent person with the characteristics and qualities of an individual with an impairment such as claimant's would not quit work for this reason. The administrative leave period was scheduled to last no more than a week, and claimant was paid during this time from his accrued leave balances, demonstrating that claimant did not face a grave situation financially as a result of being placed on leave. Claimant asserted that the existence of the investigation itself signaled "a continuation of hostility" toward him because the employer's personnel committee conducting the investigation had not acted as "an advocate" for claimant in the investigation or during his prior grievances against his previous supervisor, which were not resolved to claimant's satisfaction prior to that supervisor's retirement. Exhibit 4 at 2. Claimant further asserted he was the subject of hostility in that he was not offered mental health treatment or mental health leave in lieu of investigation and potential discipline for the February 8, 2024, incident, as claimant believed another employee had been offered these alternatives when that employee was observed experiencing a mental health crisis at work. Exhibit 4 at 2. Claimant's assertions supporting his claims of hostility are not supported by the record.

The record shows that at the time of claimant's resignation, the personnel committee had been impartially gathering the accounts of all witnesses to claimant's alleged conduct, including claimant himself, which demonstrated that claimant was capable of offering rebuttals to the evidence against him, verbally and in writing, and otherwise advocating on his own behalf. Further, as to the claim that he was treated differently from another employee who experienced a mental health crisis at work, in that situation the employer drove the employee to the hospital in the midst of an acute mental health crisis and is sufficiently dissimilar from the events of February 8, 2024, which the employer did not discover until nearly three weeks later, as to justify the employer handling the two situations differently. Therefore, claimant has not shown that he faced "hostility" or a grave situation in merely being placed on leave and being subjected to an investigation. Moreover, even if claimant had faced a grave situation as a result of these circumstances, he had the reasonable alternative of remaining on paid leave through the conclusion of the investigation and, if he was not quitting to avoid a potential discharge as he claimed, learning the investigation's results before deciding whether to quit. Accordingly, to the extent claimant may have quit work for reasons other than to avoid a potential discharge, claimant quit without good cause.

Resignation to avoid a potential discharge. Claimant submitted his resignation letter on March 2, 2024, stating that it would become effective at the exact time of day that his paid administrative leave

was scheduled to end during the morning of March 5, 2024. In the afternoon preceding claimant's letter of resignation, the employer had sent claimant an email update on the status of the investigation, implying that they believed that the weight of the evidence at that point tended to substantiate the allegations against him and that discharge was a potential outcome once the investigation concluded. It is reasonable to infer from the timing of these events that, more likely than not, claimant gave notice of his resignation when he did to prematurely end the investigation, and that he quit working for the employer on March 5, 2024, to avoid a potential discharge.

Per OAR 471-030-0038(5)(b)(F), leaving work without good cause includes "[r]esignation to avoid what would otherwise be a discharge for misconduct or potential discharge for misconduct[.]" However, a claimant has good cause to quit work to avoid being discharged, not for misconduct, when the discharge was imminent, inevitable, and would be the "kiss of death" to claimant's future job prospects. *McDowell v. Employment Dep't.*, 348 Or 605, 236 P3d 722 (2010). The question of whether a potential discharge would have been for misconduct is therefore necessary to resolve.[1]

"As used in ORS 657.176(2)(a) . . . a willful or wantonly negligent violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employee is misconduct. An act or series of actions that amount to a willful or wantonly negligent disregard of an employer's interest is misconduct." OAR 471-030-0038(3)(a). "'[W]antonly negligent' means indifference to the consequences of an act or series of actions, or a failure to act or a series of failures to act, where the individual acting or failing to act is conscious of his or her conduct and knew or should have known that his or her conduct would probably result in a violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employee." OAR 471-030-0038(1)(c). Isolated instances of poor judgment are not misconduct. OAR 471-030-0038(3)(b).

The order under review concluded that claimant's alcohol possession and use during the workday, as well as the discussions of his personal life with the office manager, did not constitute willful or wantonly negligent violations of the employer's reasonable expectations. Order No. 24-UI-263896 at 6-7. The record supports these conclusions. The order under review also concluded that claimant's February 8, 2024, outburst and subsequent failure to timely report the office manager's intent to resign to the employer did not constitute willful or wantonly negligent violations of the employer's reasonable expectations. Order No. 24-UI-263896 at 6-8. The record does not support these conclusions.

The employer's written policy prohibited "intoxication at work [or] using or dealing alcohol or drugs unlawfully at work," and per the testimony of the employer's witness, did not prohibit "having a drink during [work] hours." July 27, 2024, Transcript at 6-7. The record shows that claimant sometimes consumed a single cocktail during a workday, typically during the lunch hour, and that he offered or encouraged work colleagues to join him in drinking alcohol on these occasions. The record does not

[1] Because EAB's decision concludes that claimant quit to avoid a potential discharge for misconduct, the possibility of claimant quitting to avoid a discharge for reasons other than misconduct under circumstances that could amount to good cause is not discussed in detail. However, it should be noted that the record does not show that a discharge was imminent or inevitable at the time claimant quit work, as the investigation into claimant's conduct was ongoing and the employer had not concluded whether discipline would be imposed, though the record does show that a discharge for misconduct was possible. Further, that claimant maintained that he did not quit work to avoid the possibility of discharge, despite EAB's findings to the contrary, suggests that claimant did not consider a discharge to be the "kiss of death" to his future employment prospects regardless of whether the discharge would have been for misconduct.

suggest that the employer ever considered claimant to have been "intoxicated" at work, and does not suggest that claimant possessed or offered alcohol to anyone in violation of applicable law. Therefore, claimant did not violate the employer's policy with respect to alcohol use. As to the employer's expectation that claimant not discuss personal matters excessively with subordinate employees, the record does not show that a written policy regarding such conduct existed, or that the expectation was communicated to claimant. The office manager with whom claimant was alleged to have had the excessively personal discussions testified at hearing, but the record does not reveal any topics discussed with her that claimant knew or had reason to know would have been inappropriate or would jeopardize the employer's interests to discuss. Instead, the record suggests that the two mutually conversed about their personal lives, and that the discussions did not appear to be unwelcome at the time they occurred. Accordingly, the record does not show that claimant willfully or with wanton negligence violated the employer's reasonable expectations regarding alcohol use or personal discussions with subordinate employees.

However, with regard to claimant's February 8, 2024, outburst, the record shows a wantonly negligent violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employee. Claimant testified that on that occasion, he "lost [his] temper in front of [the office manager]," and that it was "ugly." June 18, 2024, Transcript at 8. Claimant explained that he "raised [his] voice in frustration… used a couple of expletives and… picked up a side table adjacent to her desk and lifted it an inch or so off the floor, a couple of times, and pounded it on the floor a couple times." June 18, 2024, Transcript at 8. The record shows that this frightened other tenants in the building such that they ran to the office to check on the safety of its occupants, and frightened the office manager such that she gave claimant notice of her intent to resign shortly thereafter because she was afraid to continue working with him. Claimant's conduct evinced indifference to the consequences of his actions, and claimant knew or should have known that his conduct would probably result in a violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employee. Therefore, unless excused as an isolated instance of poor judgment, this wantonly negligent act would be considered misconduct.

However, because of claimant's actions in delaying the employer's discovery of the office manager's intent to resign, the February 8, 2024, outburst was not an isolated instance of poor judgement, as it was not an isolated act. To qualify under OAR 471-030-0038(3)(b)(A), "[t]he act must be isolated. The exercise of poor judgment must be a single or infrequent occurrence rather than a repeated act or pattern of other willful or wantonly negligent behavior." The record shows that claimant's failure to immediately report the office manager's intent to resign amounted to a second wantonly negligent disregard of the employer's interests.

The employer reasonably expected that supervisory employees such as claimant would promptly report when a subordinate employee intended to resign. It can reasonably be inferred that claimant knew or should have known that failing to do so would negatively impact the employer's interests by giving them less time to find a replacement and train the replacement before the resignation became effective. Claimant and the office manager gave differing accounts at hearing of how and why news of the office manager's intent to resign was withheld from the employer's personnel committee and members of management.

The office manager testified that she told claimant of her intent to resign on or around February 12, 2024, and again "on February 14th or 15th," and that each time claimant asked her "to take more time to

think it over before [she] officially submitted a resignation letter." July 24, 2024, Transcript at 137-138. On February 20, 2024, the office manager emailed a resignation letter to claimant that mentioned her reason for quitting as "an event that had transpired," by which she meant claimant's February 8, 2024, outburst. July 24, 2024, Transcript at 139. The office manager testified that after claimant received the email, claimant "asked me to send another resignation email, removing the reference to 'the event that transpired' so he could submit that one to our supervisor[.]" July 24, 2024, Transcript at 137-138. On February 21, 2024, the office manager sent a revised resignation letter to claimant by email omitting that reference. The office manager further testified that she intended to tell claimant's supervisor and the personnel committee of her resignation and give them a copy of her letter, but claimant dissuaded her from doing so, telling her, "Oh, no, I'll handle that." July 24, 2024, Transcript at 147. On February 26, 2024, claimant advised the office manager that he had not disclosed her resignation yet to his supervisor or the personnel committee but that he planned to do so the following afternoon at a meeting that had been scheduled for other reasons. On the morning of February 27, 2024, the office manager disclosed the resignation herself, leading to claimant's suspension from work that morning before the scheduled meeting.

Claimant's testimony did not rebut the timeline of the conversations and emails as established by the office manager. However, claimant testified that he "never encouraged [the office manager] to not tell [claimant's supervisor] or anyone else" about the resignation. August 14, 2024, Transcript at 70-71. Claimant also denied "tell[ing] her or suggest[ing] to her to make any changes in the February 20th email… that resulted in the February 21st email," but explained that claimant sent the second email at his request because he considered the first email "kind of casual" so he asked her to draft "a more direct resignation letter" that he could present to management. August 14, 2024, Transcript at 75. Claimant also gave various reasons for delaying reporting the resignation, including that he first wanted to get the office manager's "opinion on how the position needs to be better crafted and give [her] an opportunity to think through this before [she made] a hasty decision," and that claimant's supervisor was busy with meetings, preparing for a sermon, taking days off, or conducting church services from February 20, 2024, through February 25, 2024. June 18, 2024, Transcript at 15-16; August 14, 2024, Transcript at 71-72.

That the two resignation emails most substantially differ in the omission of the reference to "the events that have transpired" supports the weight of the office manager's testimony more than claimant's as to the reason claimant directed her to amend the letter, as does claimant's obvious motive to conceal that the event occurred, and the facts regarding these conflicting accounts therefore have been found in accordance with the office manager's account. Further, claimant's stated reasons for delaying reporting the resignation from at least February 20, 2024, through February 27, 2024, fail to satisfactorily explain why claimant could not simply have emailed his supervisor or the personnel committee to state that the office manager intended to resign effective March 22, 2024, leaving it to them to decide whether they were too busy to review the email or take other action. More likely than not, claimant consciously delayed reporting the resignation for at least a week and attempted to conceal the office manager's reason for resigning in an effort to prevent the employer's discovery of his February 8, 2024, outburst and its effect on the office manager, and was indifferent to the consequences of these actions. Therefore, the record shows that claimant acted with wanton disregard of the employer's interest during this period, independent of, and in addition to, his wantonly negligent violation of the employer's expectations on February 8, 2024. Accordingly, neither incident could be excused as an isolated instance of poor

judgement under the rule, and each met the rule's definition of misconduct. Therefore, to the extent claimant faced a potential discharge, it was a potential discharge for misconduct.

Because claimant gave notice of his resignation on March 2, 2024, stating it would become effective March 5, 2024, the employer did not finish their investigation into claimant's conduct and therefore did not make a final decision about whether to discharge claimant for misconduct. The employer's witness agreed at hearing that, collectively, "the allegations [were] serious enough that if proven [they] would justify a discharge[.]" July 24, 2024, Transcript at 55-56. The witness clarified that, if all the allegations had been substantiated by the investigation, he would have recommended that the employer discharge claimant only as to the alcohol use and failing to report the office manager's resignation allegations, if each allegation were considered individually, and would not have recommended discharge for the February 8, 2024, outburst or the excessively personal discussions with the office manager, individually. August 14, 2024, Transcript at 21-24. Nonetheless, it is more likely than not that claimant knew he faced a potential discharge for misconduct at the time he quit work, and as previously explained, the record shows that avoiding such a potential discharge was his primary reason for quitting when he did. Accordingly, pursuant to OAR 471-030-0038(5)(b)(F), claimant left work without good cause.

For these reasons, claimant voluntarily quit work without good cause and is therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits effective March 3, 2024.

DECISION: Order No. 24-UI-263896 is set aside, as outlined above.

D. Hettle and A. Steger-Bentz;
S. Serres, not participating.

DATE of Service: <u>October 15, 2024</u>

NOTE: You may appeal this decision by filing a Petition for Judicial Review with the Oregon Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of service listed above. *See* ORS 657.282. For forms and information, you may write to the Oregon Court of Appeals, Records Section, 1163 State Street, Salem, Oregon 97310 or visit the Court of Appeals website at courts.oregon.gov. Once on the website, use the 'search' function to search for 'petition for judicial review employment appeals board'. A link to the forms and information will be among the search results.

<u>Please help us improve our service by completing an online customer service survey</u>. To complete the survey, please go to <u>https://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/5552642/EAB-Customer-Service-Survey</u>. You can access the survey using a computer, tablet, or smartphone. If you are unable to complete the survey online and need a paper copy of the survey, please contact our office.

Understanding Your Employment Appeals Board Decision

English

Attention – This decision affects your unemployment benefits. If you do not understand this decision, contact the Employment Appeals Board immediately. If you do not agree with this decision, you may file a Petition for Judicial Review with the Oregon Court of Appeals following the instructions written at the end of the decision.

Simplified Chinese

注意 – 本判决会影响您的失业救济金。 如果您不明白本判决， 请立即联系就业上诉委员会。 如果您不同意此判决，您可以按照该判决结尾所写的说明，向俄勒冈州上诉法院提出司法复审申请。

Traditional Chinese

注意 – 本判決會影響您的失業救濟金。 如果您不明白本判決， 請立即聯繫就業上訴委員會。 如果您不同意此判決，您可以按照該判決結尾所寫的說明， 向俄勒岡州上訴法院提出司法複審申請。

Tagalog

Paalala – Nakakaapekto ang desisyong ito sa iyong mga benepisyo sa pagkawala ng trabaho. Kung hindi mo naiintindihan ang desisyong ito, makipag-ugnayan kaagad sa Lupon ng mga Apela sa Trabaho (Employment Appeals Board). Kung hindi ka sumasang-ayon sa desisyong ito, maaari kang maghain ng isang Petisyon sa Pagsusuri ng Hukuman (Petition for Judicial Review) sa Hukuman sa Paghahabol (Court of Appeals) ng Oregon na sinusunod ang mga tagubilin na nakasulat sa dulo ng desisyon.

Vietnamese

Chú ý - Quyết định này ảnh hưởng đến trợ cấp thất nghiệp của quý vị. Nếu quý vị không hiểu quyết định này, hãy liên lạc với Ban Kháng Cáo Việc Làm ngay lập tức. Nếu quý vị không đồng ý với quyết định này, quý vị có thể nộp Đơn Xin Tái Xét Tư Pháp với Tòa Kháng Cáo Oregon theo các hướng dẫn được viết ra ở cuối quyết định này.

Spanish

Atención – Esta decisión afecta sus beneficios de desempleo. Si no entiende esta decisión, comuníquese inmediatamente con la Junta de Apelaciones de Empleo. Si no está de acuerdo con esta decisión, puede presentar una Aplicación de Revisión Judicial ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones de Oregon siguiendo las instrucciones escritas al final de la decisión.

Russian

Внимание – Данное решение влияет на ваше пособие по безработице. Если решение Вам непонятно – немедленно обратитесь в Апелляционный Комитет по Трудоустройству. Если Вы не согласны с принятым решением, вы можете подать Ходатайство о Пересмотре Судебного Решения в Апелляционный Суд штата Орегон, следуя инструкциям, описанным в конце решения.

Khmer

ចំណុចសំខាន់ – សេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះមានផលប៉ះពាល់ដល់អត្ថប្រយោជន៍គ្មានការងារធ្វើរបស់លោកអ្នក។ ប្រសិនបើលោកអ្នកមិនយល់អំពីសេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះ សូមទាក់ទងគណៈកម្មការឧទ្ធរណ៍ការងារភ្លាមៗ។ ប្រសិនបើលោកអ្នកមិនយល់ស្របចំពោះសេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះទេ លោកអ្នកអាចដាក់ពាក្យប្តឹងសុំឲ្យមានការពិនិត្យរឿងក្តីឡើងវិញជាមួយតុលាការឧទ្ធរណ៍រដ្ឋ Oregon ដោយអនុវត្តតាមសេចក្តីណែនាំដែលសរសេរនៅខាងចុងបញ្ចប់នៃសេចក្តីសម្រេចនេះ។

Laotian

ເອົາໃຈໃສ່ – ຄຳຕັດສິນນີ້ມີຜົນກະທົບຕໍ່ກັບເງິນຊ່ວຍເຫຼືອການຫວ່າງງານຂອງທ່ານ. ຖ້າທ່ານບໍ່ເຂົ້າໃຈຄຳຕັດສິນນີ້, ກະລຸນາຕິດຕໍ່ຫາຄະນະກຳມະການອຸທອນການຈ້າງງານໃນທັນທີ. ຖ້າທ່ານບໍ່ເຫັນດີນຳຄຳຕັດສິນນີ້, ທ່ານສາມາດຍື່ນຄຳຮ້ອງຂໍການທົບທວນຄຳຕັດສິນນຳສານອຸທອນລັດ Oregon ໄດ້ ໂດຍປະຕິບັດຕາມຄຳແນະນຳທີ່ບອກໄວ້ຢູ່ຕອນທ້າຍຂອງຄຳຕັດສິນນີ້.

Arabic

هذا القرار قد يؤثر على منحة البطالة الخاصة بك، إذا لم تفهم هذا القرار، إتصل بمجلس منازعات العمل فورا، و إذا كنت لا توافق على هذا القرار، يمكنك رفع شكوى للمراجعة القانونية بمحكمة الإستئناف بأوريغون و ذلك بإتباع الإرشادات المدرجة أسفل القرار.

Farsi

توجه - این حکم بر مزایای بیکاری شما تاثیر می گذارد. اگر با این تصمیم موافق نیستید، بلافاصله با هیأت فرجام خواهی استخدام تماس بگیرید. اگر از این حکم رضایت ندارید، می‌توانید با استفاده از دستورالعمل موجود در پایان آن، از دادگاه تجدید نظر اورگان درخواست تجدید نظر کنید.

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